What are the similarities? The Sri Lankan protests, stemming from economic distress, were led by a people’s movement, Aragalaya. This seemed spontaneous and gained traction, including tacit support from political parties. In Bangladesh too, economic issues related to reservations in employment ignited the spark. Bangladesh’s declining economic resilience was part of the problem. The student-led protests were not violent. As was the case in Sri Lanka, they received support from parties and groups adverse to the ruling dispensation.

In Sri Lanka, the protests turned violent when the ruling party’s youth cadres were unleashed on the protesters. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the protests turned violent when the youth wing of the ruling party started attacking the protesters. Then in Sri Lanka the protest became a protest against all political parties and politicians. In Bangladesh, the attack was mainly on the ruling Awami League, its supporters and minority groups. Ransacking of the leaders’ mansions was common in both countries. And in both cases, an elected leader fled the country.

The similarities continue. Gotabaya Rajapaksa left Colombo for Singapore, from where he submitted his resignation. After Singapore, he went to Thailand for two months. His ways to escape to the West were limited by allegations of human rights abuses. Efforts to bring him to a West Asian country were fruitless. Ousted Bangladeshi Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina’s son denies that any asylum application was made, and Hasina continues to stay in India for now.

After 52 days abroad, Gotabaya returned to Sri Lanka. His brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had gone to Trincomalee and stayed at a military base until it was safe to return. This is where the difference comes in. Will the situation in Bangladesh, which is currently uncertain for the Awami League, improve for its return as a party? Hasina’s son, who previously said she was “done with Bangladesh”, now says she would like to return to Bangladesh.

The discrepancy is because the Sri Lankan military was protecting public property and following government orders, although they did not fire on the protesters. In the case of Bangladesh, the military refused to fire on protesters, but failed to protect public property and hastily sacked the prime minister, instead of guarding an elected leader who perhaps should have been treated more democratically.

Before Gotabaya left Sri Lanka, he had appointed Ranil Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister. This appointment was supported by the ruling Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), although Wickremesinghe’s United National Party held only a single seat in parliament. Parliament was not dissolved, unlike in Bangladesh; it was allowed to function with a minority minister, who, after Gotabaya’s resignation, was then elected president with the support of parliament. The army and the police took orders from him. Wickremesinghe’s popularity among parliamentarians increased as he instructed the armed forces to protect all citizens, including the politicians, and attacks on their homes and families were checked. The military in Bangladesh has not been able to do this.

In Sri Lanka, the political process continued to function and constitutional requirements were met by the military. In Bangladesh, the military is trying to oust, dissolve the elected parliament and swear in an interim government made up of supposedly non-political figures with unconfirmed administrative experience.

Now they get the good will of the interim government. The speed with which Wickremesinghe had used Sri Lanka’s functioning system to control the public outburst has yet to be seen in Dhaka.

In addition, Wickremesinghe had the charisma to work with agencies at home and creditors abroad, especially India, which had often been scorned by the Rajapaksas, to bail them out of dire financial straits. Indian aid brought comfort to the Sri Lankan people, for which they are still grateful. As for Bangladesh, there is a streak of anti-Indianism, cultivated by those who have infiltrated the protests.

In Sri Lanka, Wickremesinghe saw out the remainder of Rajapaksa’s term, and elections are expected on September 21 – remarkable for a country under economic and political siege, which used its own democratic credentials to emerge from crisis. In the case of Bangladesh, this seems a bit far-fetched. Had they allowed the Riksdag to function, the interim government might have gained better legitimacy. Since the parliament was dominated by the Awami League, the expectation now is that new polls will push the Awami League into oblivion, or a minority, and allow hitherto suppressed forces to emerge.

India is skeptical of these alternative forces, which have often taken an anti-India stance. In the case of Sri Lanka, while the Rajapaksa-led SLPP pursued an anti-India line, once the writing was on the wall and Wickremesinghe took over, they did not oppose his engagement with India and remained grateful for the latter’s support.

This is the irony. Sri Lanka has shown democratic intent. In the case of Bangladesh, democratic roots are weak, and the army’s willingness to step in repeatedly, despite elected governments being in power, is perhaps the major difference between Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Gurjit Singh is a former Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN and the African Union and is Professor Emeritus, IIT Indore. The opinions expressed are personal